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DEFERENCE CONDONING APATHY: SOCIAL
VISIBILITY IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Adriana Heffley*
INTRODUCTION
Lola Mendez De Vasquez, a Salvadoran single mother of two girls,
realized that gang members (Maras) in El Salvador were attempting
to recruit her daughters.1 The Maras demanded that Lola allow her
eldest daughter, Heidy, to join the gang. After Lola refused, the
Maras threatened to kill her family.”2 One day, during Heidy’s walk
home from school, two Maras raped her.3 Knowing the Maras would
kill her and her family if she said anything, Heidy did not report the
rape.”4 El Salvador, which has one of the highest homicide rates
worldwide, has a highly evolved gang warfare system in which “rape
is used as a weapon” to terrorize the community.5 Heidy’s cousin,
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Georgia State University College of Law. My deepest gratitude goes to my
family for their love, support, and patience over the past four years. Thank you to Professor Carolina
Antonini for your guidance during the process of writing this Note and your enthusiastic encouragement
of students’ involvement in pro bono work. I am immensely grateful to my Law Review colleagues for
their hard work editing and publishing this Note.
1. Vasquez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 345 F. App’x 441, 443–44 (11th Cir. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id. If Heidy had become pregnant from this rape, she would have been legally unable to
terminate the pregnancy. AMNESTY INT’L, ON THE BRINK OF DEATH: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND
THE ABORTION BAN IN EL SALVADOR 7 (2014).
In 1997, El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly passed into law the prohibition of all forms
of abortion, making it a criminal offen[s]e for a woman to have an abortion[] or for
anyone to assist her in procuring or carrying out an abortion. Women found guilty of
terminating their pregnancies may be sentenced to long jail terms. Conviction is often
based on weak or inconclusive evidence, following flawed trials. This prohibition denies
access to safe and legal abortions for women and girls who are pregnant as a result of
rape or whose pregnancy endangers their life and health.
Id.
4. Vasquez, 345 F. App’x at 443.
5. Alberto Arce, El Salvador’s Gangs Target Women and Girls, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Nov. 5,
2014, 10:36 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-el-salvadors-gangs-target-women-andgirls-2014nov05-story.html [https://perma.cc/7DC4-DHVZ] (describing how gang members are
initiated through rape to prove their worth and ensure silence regarding crimes and explaining how
women raised in the society see rape so frequently that many do not recognize it as a crime); see also
Angelika Albaladejo, How Violence Affects Women in El Salvador, LATIN AM. WORKING GROUP (Feb.
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Yessenia, also endured threats from the Maras to join their gang on
multiple occasions.6 Eventually, the Maras threatened Yessenia at
knife-point, promising to rape her or kill her family if she did not join
them.7 Yessenia explicitly rebuffed the Maras, countering that “they
did bad things” and that “they were going to hell.”8
Seeking refuge, the women entered the United States without
inspection in 2005.9 After receiving notices to appear before a
Florida immigration judge for removal proceedings, the women
applied for asylum.10 To succeed in their claims, the women would
have to prove that their experiences at the hands of the Maras
amounted to persecution (or alternatively, that they possessed a wellfounded fear of future persecution) on account of race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group (“Particular Social Group”), rendering them unable or
22, 2016), http://www.lawg.org/action-center/lawg-blog/69-general/1590-how-violence-affects-womenin-el-salvador/ [https://perma.cc/E4T8-VPGJ].
Gangs rape and violently murder young girls, or claim them as “novias de las
pandillas”—”girlfriends” of the gangs. “Women’s bodies were treated like territory
during the civil war and continue to be today by the gangs,” says Jeanette Urquilla, the
director of the Organization of Salvadoran Women for Peace (ORMUSA). In many gangcontrolled neighborhoods, young girls expect they will be raped, abducted, and/or
murdered by the gangs.
Id.
The United States government is not blameless in this conflict—as in much of Central America during
the 1980s, the United States sent El Salvador “military advisers” and “hundreds of millions of dollars in
economic and military aid,” intensifying a civil war that claimed 75,000 lives. Raymond Bonner, Time
for a US Apology to El Salvador, NATION (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/time-fora-us-apology-to-el-salvador [https://perma.cc/AB6F-WNND]. In December 1981, a single operation
carried out by the “Atlacatl Battalion, which had just completed a three-month counterinsurgency
training course in the United States,” killed 1,200 people. Raymond Bonner, America’s Role in El
Salvador’s
Deterioration,
ATLANTIC
(Jan.
20,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/01/trump-and-el-salvador/550955/
[https://perma.cc/F78H-QWR8].
6. Vasquez, 345 F. App’x at 443.
7. Id.
8. Id. Heidy also stated that she “believed in God and did not want to do such things.” Id.
9. Id. Many immigrants who enter without inspection do not know that they should present to
Customs Officers at ports of entry to apply for asylum; others are increasingly turned away “illegally”
by border agents claiming that the government is not “accepting” asylum applications. See Ana
Adlerstein, Asylum Seekers Routinely Turned Away from Ports of Entry, Advocates Say, GUARDIAN
(Dec. 19, 2018, 7:53 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/dec/19/us-mexico-bordermigrants-claim-asylum-difficulties [https://perma.cc/53FC-CSKW].
10. Vasquez, 345 F. App’x at 443.
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unwilling to return to El Salvador.11 As asylum seekers applying in
the southeastern United States, the women faced odds of success
varying wildly from approximately 2%–75%, depending on the
immigration judge.12 Had the women applied in Atlanta, Georgia,
they would have faced a 98% chance of failure.13 Of the three
women, only Heidy was found to have suffered persecution.14
However, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that Heidy, who sought
asylum under the proposed Particular Social Group of “young
Salvadorian [sic] students who expressly oppose gang practices and
values and . . . wish to protect their family members against such
practices,” failed to establish membership in a “cognizable”
Particular Social Group.15 Approving the application of two
relatively new criteria, “particularity” and “social visibility,” the
Eleventh Circuit found that Heidy was ineligible for asylum because
no evidence indicated that the Maras “limited” their recruitment to

11. Establishing Asylum Eligibility, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2018). Establishing past persecution
gives rise to a presumption that the applicant also possesses a well-founded fear of persecution. Id.
Further, if applicants can establish only that they possess a fear of future persecution, not a history of
past persecution, they must prove that simply relocating to a different place within their country of
origin would not eliminate the danger. Id. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). Additionally, applicants may need to
defend against government arguments that conditions in their countries of origin have changed since
their departure such that the applicant no longer possesses a well-founded fear of persecution. Id.
§ 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). Asylum-seekers must also take care to avoid any perception that they firmly
resettled in a third country before entering the United States (for example, receiving asylum in a third
country before seeking asylum in the United States could constitute firm resettlement).
Id. § 208.13(c)(2)(B). Once an asylum-seeker fulfills all the statutory requirements, she still must
receive a favorable exercise of discretion by the immigration judge. Id. § 208.13(b)(1)(i). Persons with
certain criminal histories, including persecution of others, serious nonpolitical crimes, and terrorism, are
barred from receiving asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c) (detailing grounds for asylum-seeker inadmissibility
under the Immigration and Naturalization Act §§ 208(a)(2) and 208(b)(2)).
12. Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts Before and After the Attorney
General’s Directive, TRAC IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/240/include/denialrates.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/54V2-AMUS] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). Of the courts in the southeastern United
States feeding into the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Miami’s immigration judges produce the
highest asylum grant rates. Id.
13. OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION
REVIEW,
FY
2016
STATISTICS
YEARBOOK,
at
K2
(2017),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/fysb16/download [https://perma.cc/RM5E-V9E9].
14. Vasquez, 345 F. App’x at 443.
15. Id. at 446.
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students in Heidy’s position and because students in Heidy’s position
were not “generally . . . recognizable by others in the community.”16
The criteria used to deny Heidy’s asylum application, particularity
and social visibility, were not originally part of the Particular Social
Group inquiry.17 Social visibility, which requires asylum-seekers to
prove that they were perceived as part of a “group” by society at
large in their countries of origin, was not referenced as a requirement
to forming a Particular Social Group in the Eleventh Circuit until
2006.18 Before the early 2000s, the circuit courts generally agreed
that establishing persecution on account of membership in a
Particular Social Group mirrored the requirement for establishing
persecution based on race, religion, nationality, or political opinion.19
This consensus recognized that each ground “describes persecution
aimed
at
an
immutable
characteristic:
a
characteristic . . . either . . . beyond the power of an individual to
change or . . . so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that
it ought not be required to be changed.”20 The social-visibility
requirement, which gained acceptance in the circuit courts beginning
in 2006 to 2008, has been roundly criticized as irreconcilable with the
pre-2000 line of accepted case law by commentators, international
organizations, and some circuit courts.21 In their zeal to ensure that
Particular Social Groups do not function as “catch-alls” for
individuals who cannot neatly tie their persecution to their race,

16. Id. The particularity requirement seeks to combat what courts viewed as overly broad,
amorphously defined Particular Social Groups. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584–85 (B.I.A. 2008).
Under this requirement, asylum applicants must concretely define the boundaries of their Particular
Social Group. Id. at 585. Particular Social Groups defined too broadly or “inchoate” (for example,
young women in Brazil) will fail the particularity inquiry and result in asylum application denials. Id. at
586.
17. Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular
Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender,
27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 48 (2008).
18. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11th Cir. 2006).
19. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
20. Id.
21. Nitzan Sternberg, Do I Need To Pin a Target to My Back?: The Definition of “Particular Social
Group” in U.S. Asylum Law, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 245, 295–96 (2011).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss3/6

4

Heffley: Deference Condoning Apathy: Social Visibility in the Eleventh Cir

2019]

DEFERENCE CONDONING APATHY

781

religion, nationality, or political opinion, the courts have levied a
requirement that results in vastly different outcomes for similar case
facts and denials of claims that would have fulfilled the requirements
for asylum before 2006.22 United States circuit courts’ continued
rubber-stamping of lower courts’ applications of the social-visibility
criterion has strangled asylum grant rates and emboldened callous
treatment toward asylum-seekers in immigration courts like Atlanta,
where immigration judges have been observed belittling applicants
and conducting proceedings without interpreters.23 Were Lola,
Yessenia, and Heidy to apply for asylum in Atlanta today, not only
would they face a one-in-fifty chance of success but they would
relive their trauma before judges noted for “appearing wholly
disinterested” in asylum applicants’ testimonies and only becoming
alert when “scold[ing] an attorney or a respondent.”24
This Note examines the history of the social-visibility requirement
for Particular Social Groups in Eleventh Circuit asylum claims and
the adjudication disparities that have resulted from its imposition in
the southeastern United States. Part I of this Note introduces the
asylum application process, examines the historical treatment of
Particular Social Groups nationally, and traces the recent restrictions
on Particular Social Groups within the Eleventh Circuit in
particular.25 Part II compares the Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of
Particular Social Groups to treatment in the Third and Seventh
Circuits and considers how previously successful claims for asylum
would fare under the current state of the law in the Eleventh
22. Id. at 295.
23. Letter from Hallie Ludsin, Professor, Emory Law Sch., to Juan P. Osuna, Dir., Exec. Office for
Immigration Review (Mar. 2, 2017), available at https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/2017atl_complaint_letter_final.pdf.
24. Id.; see also OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & STATISTICS, supra note 13.This grant rate has a
chilling effect on immigration attorneys’ willingness to accept asylum cases and access to pro or lowbono asylum assistance in Atlanta. Ted Hesson, Why It’s Almost Impossible To Get Asylum in Atlanta,
VICE (Jun. 8, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bn38x5/why-its-almost-impossible-to-getasylum-in-atlanta [https://perma.cc/4YRZ-4UCS]. According to Professor Shana Tabak, although
attorneys outside Atlanta can generally expect relief if they enter court “with good preparation and a
meritorious case,” in Atlanta, “attorneys don’t seem to have that feeling when they go into a
courtroom.” Id.
25. See infra Part I.
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Circuit.26 Last, Part III proposes that the Eleventh Circuit adopt a
standard suggested by a prominent source of United States asylum
law to evaluate Particular Social Groups and weighs the effects of
this standard.27
I. Background
A. Origins of United States Asylum Law
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951
Convention”)—the “only global legal instrument dealing with the
status and rights of refugees”—originally set forth the modern
definition of “refugee” and defined “the kind of legal protection,
other assistance, and social rights” that governments should provide
to refugees.28 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(“UNHCR”) serves as the “guardian” of the 1951 Convention and
subsequent 1967 Protocol.29 In 1980, the United States codified its
international treaty obligations with the Refugee Act of 1980,
declaring, “[I]t is the historic policy of the United States to respond
to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their
homelands,” and promising to “encourage all nations to provide
assistance and resettlement opportunities to refugees to the fullest
extent possible.”30
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part III.
28. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150; UNHCR, THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967
PROTOCOL 5 (Sept. 2011) [hereinafter THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES
AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL]. Under the Convention, a person is a refugee if he, “[a]s a result of events
occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well[-]founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group[,] or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to
it.” U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
29. THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL,
supra note 28, at 4. The 1967 Protocol “broaden[ed]” the 1951 Convention by eliminating its original
“geographical and time limits”; for example, the limitation of refugees to people affected by events that
occurred before January 1, 1951. Id.
30. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102. Numerous subsequent
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B. Applying for Asylum
1. Elements of Successful Asylum Claims
To establish eligibility for asylum, applicants must prove that they
are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin because of
past persecution (or a “well-founded fear” of future persecution) “on
account of” race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a Particular Social Group.31
The elements of an asylum case are not statutorily defined; they
have evolved through case law over the last several decades.32
Persecution “requires more than a few isolated incidents of verbal
harassment or intimidation, unaccompanied by any physical
punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of
liberty.”33 Applicants need to prove that one of the grounds was “at
statutes have modified immigration law; notable among these is 1996’s Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IRIRA”). See generally Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. IRIRA added a requirement that
asylum seekers demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence” that they filed their asylum applications
within one year of arriving within the United States, although some exceptional circumstances (for
example, extreme medical conditions like comas or post-traumatic stress disorder) can allow asylum
seekers to circumvent the requirement. Id. § 604(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-691 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (1998)).
31. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2018). Successfully proving past persecution accords applicants the
“presumption” of a well-founded fear of future persecution. Id. However, an asylum officer or
immigration judge can rebut this presumption by determining that “a fundamental change in
circumstances” occurred “such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution” in
his home country or that “the applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of”
his home country. Id.
32. Martine Forneret, Pulling the Trigger: An Analysis of Circuit Court Review of the “Persecutor
Bar,” 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1007, 1039 (2013).
33. Mikhailevitch v. INS., 146 F.3d 384, 390 (6th Cir. 1998). Further, applicants must prove that the
persecution suffered entailed both objective and subjective components. See Saleh v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 962 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The applicant must show he has a subjective fear of
persecution[] and that the fear is grounded in objective facts.”). Asylum seekers typically cannot
establish that “prosecution for criminal violations of fairly administered laws” entails persecution.
Janusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d 46, 48 (3d Cir. 1991). But see Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970, 972–79
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (ruling that a former Ghanaian soldier who, “disturbed by worsening political
conditions (including summary execution of eight generals and several judges, among others),”
committed to “participate in resistance activities” involving “free[ing] his friend from prison
and . . . support[ing] a coup against the military government” did suffer persecution by the government
because the Ghanaian government provided no due process protections, may have punished the
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least one central reason” for the claimed persecution.34 The phrase
“on account of” requires that the persecution be “causally linked” to
one of the statutory grounds.35 Among the five grounds (race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a Particular
Social Group), Particular Social Groups—the most amorphous,
politically vulnerable ground—generates the most confusion and
debate.36
2. Procedure
Applicants can seek asylum affirmatively within one year of
arrival in the United States (subject to certain exceptions) or
defensively after being placed in removal (deportation)
proceedings.37 Affirmative asylum seekers attend nonadversarial
applicant “arbitrarily,” and given the political conditions in Ghana, “a coup [may have been] the only
means by which political change [could have been] effected.”).
34. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–13, § 101, 119 Stat. 231, 303 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006)).
35. Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A Unifying
Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777, 781 (2003). This requirement, called the
“nexus” between one of the five protected grounds and the persecution, is often difficult to prove:
In INS v. Elias-Zacarias, the Court considered the case of a Guatemalan man who was
seeking asylum based on political opinion. His basic claim was that he was being
pressured to join a guerrilla group opposed to the government. He feared that if he did
join, the government would harm him and his family, so he left Guatemala. In an opinion
by Justice Scalia, the Court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals’[s] (“BIA”)
decision denying asylum and reversed the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals, finding that any
persecution Elias-Zacarias would face could not be proven to be on account of his
political opinion. Elias-Zacarias failed to demonstrate that he had a political opinion or
that his opinion was the motivating factor behind his persecution. In short, the Court
required convincing evidence of the motive of the persecutor, which would (presumably)
prove that the asylum seeker was being persecuted on account of an enumerated
ground. Through this decision, the Court effectively shifted the focus from the fear
experienced by the victim to the thoughts and motives of the persecutor. Thus, a two-part
test to establish a nexus between persecution and an enumerated ground developed. To
pass this test, the asylum seeker must (1) establish that she has a race, religion,
nationality, social group membership, or political opinion, and (2) show that the
persecutor was motivated by that race, religion, etc. Proving the persecutor’s motive is
often difficult, if not impossible, and courts have subsequently encountered significant
difficulties in applying Elias-Zacarias’s holding.
Brigette L. Frantz, Note, Proving Persecution: The Burdens of Establishing a Nexus in Religious
Asylum Claims and the Dangers of New Reforms, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 499, 511 (2007).
36. Marouf, supra note 17, at 48.
37. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss3/6

8

Heffley: Deference Condoning Apathy: Social Visibility in the Eleventh Cir

2019]

DEFERENCE CONDONING APATHY

785

interviews with asylum officers.38 Defensive asylum seekers and
affirmative asylum seekers whose applications were denied by an
asylum officer (and are not present in the country under another legal
status like a work visa) are issued a notice to appear for a hearing in
front of an immigration judge.39
During this adversarial process, the immigration judge hears
arguments from the applicant and from the United States government
(represented by an attorney from Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE)).40 Approximately 91% of asylum seekers who
face this hearing without an attorney are denied asylum.41 If the
immigration judges exercise their discretion to deny the application,
the decision can be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”), the United States’s “highest administrative body for
interpreting and applying immigration laws.”42 Faced with another
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states
[https://perma.cc/6D2L-8KS6] (last updated Oct. 19, 2015).
38. Id.
39. Id. Defensive asylum seekers are typically detained. To secure release from detention, a detained
asylum seeker must pass a “credible fear” interview. Review of Credible Fear Determination, 8
C.F.R. § 1003.42 (2018). Taking into account an asylum seeker’s credibility, asylum officers examine
whether a “significant possibility” exists that the asylum seeker could establish asylum eligibility in a
full hearing. Id. If a significant possibility exists, the asylum officer may release the asylum seeker on
bond. Id.
40. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 37.
41. Judge
Earle
B.
Wilson,
TRAC
IMMIGR.,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judgereports/00132ATL/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8RT6L629] (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
42. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-ofimmigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/R7AB-CBCF] (last updated Oct. 15, 2018). Even if an
immigration judge finds an applicant eligible to receive asylum, the judge may exercise discretion to
deny asylum relief:
[C]ourts and [immigration judges (IJs)] should consider, when relevant, the following
non-exhaustive list of factors as part of the totality of the circumstances. On the positive
side, an IJ should consider:
1) Family, business, community, and employment ties to the United States, and length of
residence and property ownership in this country;
2) Evidence of hardship to the alien and his family if deported to any country, or if denied
asylum such that the alien cannot be reunited with family members (as derivative asylees)
in this country;
3) Evidence of good character, value, or service to the community, including proof of
genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record is present;
4) General humanitarian reasons, such as age or health;
5) Evidence of severe past persecution and/or well-founded fear of future persecution,
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denial, asylum seekers may seek federal review by a court of appeals.
These appeals rarely succeed. The Courts of Appeals usually defer to
the BIA under the doctrine of Chevron deference, which means, that
the BIA’s conclusions can only be overturned if “any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”43
Considering the “extreme hardships and difficulties that result” from
deportation, some commentators have called for more exacting
review of lower courts’ decisions.44 Chevron deference, which bows
to the BIA’s judgment in part to promote adjudicative uniformity, has
precipitated a post-social-visibility drop in the percentage of cases
including consideration of other relief granted or denied the applicant (e.g., withholding
of removal or CAT protection).
On the negative side, relevant factors include the:
1) Nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground;
2) Presence of significant violations of immigration laws;
3) Presence of a criminal record and the nature, recency, and seriousness of that record,
including evidence of recidivism;
4) Lack of candor with immigration officials, including an actual adverse credibility
finding by the IJ;
5) Other evidence that indicates bad character or undesirability for permanent residence
in the United States.
We emphasize that an IJ need not analyze or even list every factor. To the contrary, we
explicitly reject such an “inflexible test” and recognize the “undesirability and ‘difficulty,
if not impossibility, of defining any standard in discretionary matters of this
character.’” But at the very least, an IJ must demonstrate that he or she reviewed the
record and balanced the relevant factors and must discuss the positive or adverse factors
that support his or her decision.
Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 510–11 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2018). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently invalidated
§ 1252(e), but § 1252(b) remains valid. Thursaissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-55313,
2019 WL 1065027 at *5 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2019). Before 1984, courts applied varying, inconsistent
standards of review to decisions from administrative agencies. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2082 (1990). In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., the Supreme Court implemented “a two-step inquiry. The first question
was whether Congress had explicitly foreclosed the agency’s decision. The second was whether that
decision was reasonable or permissible.” Id. at 2084. Chevron deference, in combination with the
“limited scope of judicial review,” began to concentrate the BIA’s power “not only to decide cases but
also to shape future law. As a result, the proposed centralization of judicial review would alter the extent
of the concentration of adjudicatory power only marginally.” Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring
Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1707 (2010).
44. Matthew F. Soares, Agencies and Aliens: A Modified Approach to Chevron Deference in
Immigration Cases, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 925, 944 (2014). Previously a common law concept applied in
criminal and early immigration cases, the idea of “lenity” pushed courts “to construe ambiguous laws in
favor of the defendant due to the overwhelming constitutional concerns associated with punishment and
depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property.” Id. at 933 (emphasis added).
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reversed or remanded by a court of appeals from 17.5% in 2006 to
11.3% in 2016.45
C. The Thorniest Basis for Asylum: Particular Social Group
For years, Matter of Acosta offered leading guidance in forming
cognizable Particular Social Groups; members must possess a
“common, immutable characteristic” (similar to race, religion,
nationality, or political opinion) that is “so fundamental to individual
identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be changed.”46
Immutable characteristics that may form the basis for a Particular
Social Group under Matter of Acosta’s formulation include “sex,
color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances . . . a shared past
experience such as former military leadership or land ownership.”47
In adopting this approach to Particular Social Groups, the BIA
expressed its objective of restricting asylum grants to applicants who
were either unable or could not be conscientiously required to avoid
persecution by forsaking past experiences or values central to their
identities.48
1. An Additional Requirement: Social Visibility
In its 2006 decision, In Re C-A-, the BIA began to include social
visibility as an additional requirement for Particular Social Groups.
This change occurred after the UNHCR refined its definition of
Particular Social Groups, limiting members to “persons who share a

45. John Guendelsberger, Circuit Court Decisions for December 2016 and Calendar Year Totals for
2016, IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR (Exec. Office for Immigration Review, D.C.), Jan. 2017, at 3; Soares, supra
note 44, at 931. As opposed to cases involving expedited removal orders and those in which
“noncitizens are removable on crime-related grounds,” which cannot be appealed, asylum cases are
reviewable and “make up the bulk of the courts’ immigration caseloads.” Legomsky, supra note 43, at
1643–44. Appeals from BIA decisions flood federal courts, occupying a significant portion of federal
circuits’ caseloads and resulting in “duplicat[ion]” of the BIA’s decisions, with few cases reaching a
different result. Id. at 1646.
46. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 212 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
47. Id. at 233.
48. Id.
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common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or
who are perceived as a group by society.”49 The same year, in
Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals suggested that the social-visibility criterion was always a
part of the Particular Social Group analysis dating back to before
Matter of Acosta, stating that “the two illustrations provided in
Acosta, ‘former military leadership and land ownership’—are also
easily recognizable traits.”50 Ultimately, the court in Castillo-Arias
found that noncriminal informants working against the Cali drug
cartel in Colombia were not sufficiently “visible” to form a Particular
Social Group.51 Because “the very nature of [serving as an informant
against a drug cartel] prevented the applicant from ‘being recognized
by society at large,’” he was “not visible enough to be considered a
member of a ‘particular social group.’”52
2. Castillo-Arias’s Legacy in the Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit continued to defer to the BIA’s new criterion
in 2008, holding that “Honduran schoolboys who conscientiously
refuse to join gangs” were not sufficiently socially visible.53 In
Gomez-Benitez v. U.S. Attorney General, the court again warned
against the use of Particular Social Groups as “a ‘catch-all’ ground
49. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 2006); UNHCR,
Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context
of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶
11, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter Guidelines on International Protection]; see
also S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 579–87 (B.I.A. 2008) (holding that two Salvadoran teenagers who
were approached by MS-13 gang members and asked to join the gang, beaten, threatened, and told their
sister would be raped if they did not join the gang did not belong to a sufficiently socially visible group
because “Salvadoran youth who are recruited by gangs but refuse to join” are not “‘perceived as a
group’ by society[]” and do not “suffer from a higher incidence of crime than the rest of the population.”
Although the court was wary of allowing asylum seekers to define particular social groups by the
persecution their members experienced, this reasoning seems to require a higher level of persecution and
focused targeting for a group to be considered a particular social group.).
50. Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1194.
51. Id. at 1198. However, countless Particular Social Groups accepted under Matter of Acosta’s
formula might not be sufficiently “visible” in society’s eyes to form a more visible group than
noncriminal informants working against a drug cartel. Id. at 1197.
52. Id.
53. Gomez-Benitez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 295 F. App’x 324, 326 (11th Cir. 2008).
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for all persons alleging persecution . . . who cannot establish refugee
status under any of the other recognized grounds.”54 The next year,
the Eleventh Circuit extended this same reasoning to the proposed
Particular Social Group of young men who pledged membership to a
formal group protesting against the MS-13 gang.55 In 2010, the
Eleventh Circuit held that a dental-prosthetics expert in Colombia
was not a member of a sufficiently visible Particular Social Group.56
The same year, professionals unwilling to collaborate and share their
knowledge and skills with revolutionaries against the Colombian
government were also denied status as members of a Particular Social
Group.57 Drawing a parallel to noncriminal informants, the Eleventh
Circuit held in Jai Lok Ling v. U.S. Attorney General that business
owners who owe money to loan sharks lack social visibility because
loan sharks’ crimes “tend to be criminal in nature and are often
conducted secretly.”58
Even when an individual is misidentified publicly in a Honduran
newspaper as a murderer, the Eleventh Circuit will not find that she
is sufficiently socially visible to be counted as part of a Particular
Social Group if doing so would run the risk of allowing her to use

54. Id.
55. See Navas-Villanueva v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 338 F. App’x 859, 861 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding
that a young man belonging to a formal group protesting against MS-13 was not a member of a
particular social group because he was not sufficiently socially visible).
56. See Cantillo-Charris v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 382 F. App’x 817, 819–20 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding
that a dentist who operated a dental-prosthetics laboratory and received numerous threats from gang
members promising consequences if he did not provide dental-prosthetics services who left his
profession and began to sell bananas instead in order to escape from the gangs was not sufficiently
socially visible).
57. See de Padilla v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 403 F. App’x 472, 473 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that a
man with education and training desired by revolutionaries who refused to share his skills to
revolutionaries was not a member of a particular social group because “countless persons could declare
membership based on any occupational skill they possess that is desired by the revolutionaries.”).
58. Ling v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 404 F. App’x 426, 429 (11th Cir. 2010). Like noncriminal
informants, business owners in debt to loan sharks are too “numerous and inchoate”; the court also
found this particular-social-group formulation unacceptable because it was defined by persecution by
the loan sharks. Id. The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its distaste for noncriminal informants in Pinzon
Pulido v. U.S. Attorney General, where it found that a paid informant who worked against a Colombian
cartel for several years engaged in “risks similar to those of the police or military” and thus could not be
considered a member of a cognizable particular social group. Pinzon Pulido v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 427
F. App’x 729, 730 (11th Cir. 2011).
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membership in this Particular Social Group as a catchall when her
persecution did not fit into one of the other four grounds.59
Additionally, wearing a uniform specifically distinguishing oneself as
a United States embassy security guard will not render an individual
sufficiently socially visible for the Eleventh Circuit. In 2011, the
court determined that the Haitian society would not perceive a former
embassy guard as a member of a Particular Social Group because he
did not prove that this group would “be generally recognized and
perceived as a group in [his] community.”60 This narrow construction
of Particular Social Groups continues today.61 In the summer of
2018, then-Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions III issued a
controversial opinion in Matter of A-B, overturning a previous BIA
decision approving surviving domestic violence as a potential basis
59. Solis v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 411 F. App’x 256, 257–58 (11th Cir. 2011). In declining the
woman’s petition for review of the single-panel BIA decision, the Eleventh Circuit also offered as
justification “that being misidentified by a newspaper as a murderer falls outside the category of shared
experiences that Congress intended to protect.” Id. at 259. Although the woman’s son and husband were
murdered in Guatemala after her misidentification, the Eleventh Circuit found that her failure to
“present any evidence beyond her own assertion” that the misidentification spurred the murders
dampened her motion to reopen her asylum application. Solis v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 463 F. App’x 859,
862 (11th Cir. 2012).
60. Pierre v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 432 F. App’x 845, 848 (11th Cir. 2011).
61. In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit also upheld the BIA’s decision that a family targeted as part of a
blood feud could not represent a cognizable Particular Social Group because the targeted family was not
“sufficiently visible to Albanian society as a whole.” Perkeci v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 446 F. App’x 236,
239 (11th Cir. 2011). Two years later, the Eleventh Circuit also found that a woman seeking asylum on
the basis of her membership in the Particular Social Group of attractive women sexually harassed by
government or police offers was not sufficiently socially visible. Udesh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 518 F.
App’x 921, 924 (11th Cir. 2013). In 2014, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a lower court’s determination that
witnesses to a police murder in South Africa were, like noncriminal informants, insufficiently socially
visible to belong to a Particular Social Group. Swart v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 552 F. App’x 922, 925 (11th
Cir. 2014). The same year, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly defied Matter of Acosta by affirming that
former military members who testified in successful investigations and prosecutions of illegal armed
groups in Colombia were not socially visible because the criminal proceedings were private and, as with
regular noncriminal informants, the court found no evidence that “the drug cartel would treat informants
differently from any other person the cartel perceived to have interfered with its activities.” Granados v.
U.S. Attorney Gen., 578 F. App’x 866, 871–72 (11th Cir. 2014). The court also noted that the danger
cartels pose to the population at large diluted the court’s perception of danger to this witness
specifically: “virtually the entire population is a potential subject of persecution by the cartel.” Id. In
2015, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision not to recognize religious teachers who
explicitly oppose gang membership and “deter other[s] from joining” gangs as socially visible by
insisting that the Roman Catholic catechist at issue, who urged his constituents against joining the
Maras, “had not distinguished his particular social group from people who oppose criminal
organizations generally.” Balam-Ruiz v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 608 F. App’x 908, 909 (11th Cir. 2015).
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for forming a Particular Social Group.62 Matter of A-B encourages
immigration judges to take an even stricter posture toward Particular
Social Groups, urging that “[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to
domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by nongovernmental
actors will not qualify for asylum,” sparking fears among immigrant
activists that judges would outright forbid Particular Social Groups
involving gender or gang ties.63 Although the Eleventh Circuit has
reviewed BIA decisions since Matter of A-B, it has not yet cited the
decision as controlling authority.
II. Analysis
The UNHCR itself, whose updated 2002 guidelines inspired the
social-visibility requirement, has suggested that the BIA
misinterpreted its guidance by adopting social visibility as an
additional requirement to the Particular-Social-Group inquiry, stating
in an amicus brief that “groups need not be easily recognizable to the
general public” to be perceived as a Particular Social Group.64
Instead, the UNHCR clarified that its guidelines “sought to
reconcile” two different approaches to evaluating Particular Social
Groups (“protected characteristics” and “social perception”) by
62. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 316 (U.S. Attorney Gen. 2018) (interim decision), abrogated by
Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018) (appeal filed D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019).
63. See id. at 320.
64. Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae,
Michelle Thomas et al., A75-597-033/-034/-035/-036, 6 (B.I.A. Jan. 25, 2007),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45c34c244.html [https://perma.cc/9T6Z-KTTF] [hereinafter Brief
for Refugees as Amicus Curiae]. The UNHCR criticized the BIA’s imposition of social visibility as
determinative to the Particular Social Group inquiry:
DHS argues in its brief that the Board has adopted a new test in Matter of C-A-, 23 I &
N Dec. 951 (BIA 2006) that adds an additional requirement to the “immutable or
fundamental characteristic” approach to the particular social group analysis that was
established in Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (1985). According to DHS, the
additional requirement is that there must be “social perception” or “visibility” of the
group. It is not clear to us that the Board meant to adopt such a requirement,
particularly given that the Board in Matter of C-A- referenced the definition set forth
in the UNHCR Guidelines on Membership of a Particular Social Group, which does
not include a requirement that a particular social group meet the “social perception”
test nor that the group be “socially visible.”
Id. at 6. The UNHCR does caution against imposing too rigid a test, urging the Board against “adopting
such a rigid approach which may disregard groups that the Convention is designed to protect.” Id. at 10.
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endorsing a “single standard.” In its brief, the UNHCR emphasized
that “a particular social group is a group of persons who share a
common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or
who are perceived as a group by society.”65
Not only has the international organization that influences much of
United States asylum law denounced imposition of the socialvisibility requirement but various United States circuit courts have
criticized or declined to apply it.66 Even among the circuits courts
that do apply the social-visibility requirement, like the Eleventh
Circuit, the social-visibility criterion leads to drastically disparate
outcomes.67 Certain types of cases—most notably gang-based and
gender-based persecution claims—are disproportionately shuttered
by the social-visibility requirement. Unlike claims based on readily
apparent grounds like membership in an indigenous tribe, these
claims based on personal convictions or stemming from past trauma
can often be concealed. Both types of claims involve especially
vulnerable people (for example, cartel informants and women
opposed to forced marriages) who must by necessity remain invisible
to escape further persecution. But by expending every effort to avoid
standing out in society (for example, women pretending to support
female genital mutilation to avoid being beaten for speaking out
against community leaders), these vulnerable individuals, often
persecuted due to factors more complex and localized than race,
religion, nationality, or political opinion, can lose their eligibility to
win asylum in the United States. In this way, the social-visibility
requirement acts as a perverse incentive. Only by broadcasting their
vulnerabilities to their oppressors can persecuted people hope to
prove that they were sufficiently socially visible in their native
countries to win asylum in the United States.

65. Id. at 6.
66. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 603–04 (3d Cir. 2011);
Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2009).
67. Jason Dzubow, The Easiest Office to Win Asylum, and Why You Shouldn’t Apply There,
ASYLUMIST (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.asylumist.com/2016/02/25/the-easiest-office-to-win-asylumand-why-you-shouldnt-apply-there/ [https://perma.cc/TX7U-RHSX].
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A. The Third and Seventh Circuits Reject the Social-Visibility
Requirement
In 2009, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the other circuit courts’
adoption of the BIA’s social-visibility requirement but declined to
apply it.68 In Gatimi v. Holder, the court held that “it makes no
sense” to require a Kenyan defector from the Mungiki political group
to show that “others in Kenyan society [would] recognize him as a
former member of Mungiki.”69 Requiring vulnerable classes of
individuals to be recognized by society is unrealistic because these
targeted people “will take pains to avoid being socially visible.”70
Thus, to the extent that “members of the targeted group are
successful in remaining invisible, they will not be ‘seen’ by other
people in society ‘as a segment of the population.’”71 The Seventh
Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court’s reminder that “the
Board’s definition of ‘particular social group’ is entitled to
deference”; however, the court maintained that the BIA
“inconsistent[ly]” applied social visibility by recognizing cognizable
Particular Social Groups “without reference to social visibility” while
also refusing to classify “socially invisible groups as particular social
groups . . . without repudiating the other line of cases.”72
Two years later, the Third Circuit also rejected social visibility as
inconsistent with the Acosta line of cases.73 The court pointed to
various Particular Social Groups that were approved following
Acosta—women “opposed to female genital mutilation,”
“homosexuals required to register in Cuba,” and “former members of
the El Salvador national police”—noting it was “hard-pressed to
68. Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 616. The court had “no quarrel” with their sister court’s rejection of various
proposed Particular Social Groups, but “just [didn’t] see what work ‘social visibility’ does” that
improves upon the Matter of Acosta test. Id.
69. Id. at 615.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id. “Women who have not yet undergone female genital mutilation in tribes that practice it do
not look different from anyone else. A homosexual in a homophobic society will pass as heterosexual.”
Id.
72. Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615–16.
73. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 603–04 (3d Cir. 2011).
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understand how the ‘social visibility’ requirement was satisfied” in
these prior cases involving groups not particularly “recognizable by
others in the country.”74 The court insisted that Chevron deference
does not entitle the BIA to “generate erratic, irreconcilable
interpretations of their governing statutes” and stated that it would
assess “whether the agency’s current interpretation is ‘reasonable’”
by evaluating the BIA’s “[c]onsistency over time and across
subjects.”75 Because the Third Circuit considered social visibility
“inconsistent with past BIA decisions,” it concluded that social
visibility “is an unreasonable addition” to the components of a
cognizable Particular Social Group.76
B. The Eleventh Circuit’s Application of Social Visibility
The Eleventh Circuit—and Atlanta’s Immigration Court
specifically—is one of the most difficult regions in which to win
asylum.77 Out of 604 claims adjudicated by the Atlanta Immigration

74. Id. at 604.
75. Id.
76. Id. In 2013, the Ninth Circuit responded to the Third Circuit, acknowledging that although “it is
difficult to articulate precisely what the BIA meant by ‘social visibility,’” this requirement does not
entail literal “on-sight visibility”; instead, the court interpreted social visibility to mean that a social
group is “understood by others to constitute [a] social group[].” Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d
1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2013). Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that the persecutors’ understanding of
their victims was most dispositive in finding a group sufficiently visible:
The petitioner is persecuted precisely because the persecutor recognizes the object of
his persecution. Further, the petitioner’s awareness of her own group status is not a
baseline requirement—for example, an infant may not be aware of race, sex, or
religion. Society in general may also not be aware of a particular religious sect in a
remote region. However, a group may be persecuted because of the persecutor’s
perceptions of the existence of those groups. We do not mean to imply that an alien
should be required in every case to prove that his persecutors perceived his social
group to be socially visible. When there is evidence that a social group is visible to
society, there is no need to prove that the petitioner’s persecutors perceived that group
as visible. We mean only to suggest that evidence of perceptions in society as a whole
is not the exclusive means of demonstrating social visibility. When a particular social
group is not visible to society in general (as with a characteristic that is geographically
limited, or that individuals may make efforts to hide), social visibility may be
demonstrated by looking to the perceptions of persecutors.
Id. at 1089–90 (internal citations omitted).
77. See OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & STATISTICS, supra note 13, at K2.
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Court in 2016, only fourteen were granted.78 Compared to a national
average grant rate of 43%, this 2% approval rate suggests that the
Atlanta Immigration Court is applying the law significantly more
harshly than its peers.79 Indeed, the vast disparities among national
grant rates, which range from 0% to 85%, indicate that inconsistent
interpretation of the law poses a serious problem across the United
States.80
Immigration judges, concerned about fraud, report denying asylum
applications because they were “copied word-for-word” from other
applicants’ applications.81 But legal observers, lacking evidence that
the rate of fraud among asylum seekers is higher in Georgia than
other states, suggest that contempt or apathy toward asylum seekers
may help to explain the Atlanta Immigration Court’s low asylum
approval rate.82 When students from Emory Law School observed
proceedings at the Atlanta Immigration Court, they were told by one
judge that his applicants were “trying to scam the system.”83 Another
judge regularly “closed his eyes during hearings” and leaned back
with his head in his hands in an apparent expression of disinterest,
and a third spoke to a Portuguese-speaking applicant who did not
understand English without an interpreter, outside the presence of his
attorney, before setting a $25,000 bond.84 This report supports the

78. Id.
79. See id.
80. See id. In addition to disparate applications of the law, swells of different types of cases reaching
different immigration courts contribute to these inconsistent grant rates. Dzubow, supra note 67. Some
immigration courts, like Houston, are likelier, due to proximity, to receive Central American asylum
applicants fleeing gang persecution, who are less likely to neatly fit into one of the prescribed grounds
for asylum. Id. Larger numbers of these disfavored cases may lead to lower grant rates in the southern
United States. Id.
81. Jeremy Redmon, Winning Asylum Is Tough in Georgia’s Immigration Courts, ATLANTA J.CONST. (Apr. 18, 2014), https://www.ajc.com/news/national-govt—politics/winning-asylum-toughgeorgia-immigration-courts/lQpQfNsmOALlIX8sB2HXXP [https://perma.cc/Q753-83PK].
82. Letter from Hallie Ludsin, supra note 23.
83. Id.
84. Id. In 2018, the median U.S. immigration bond was approximately $7,500. Three-fold Difference
in
Immigration
Bond
Amounts
by
Court
Location,
TRAC
IMMIGRATION,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/519 (last visited Jan. 8, 2019). In most Atlanta immigration court
cases, the students observed “[i]mmigration [j]udges den[ying] bond to immigrant detainees[] or
set[ting] bonds at a prohibitively high amount.” Letter from Hallie Ludsin, supra note 23.
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idea that Atlanta’s remarkably low asylum grant rates result in part
from insufficient attention and resources for asylum seekers’ due
process rights.
According to the Georgia Commission on Interpreters, courts must
“provide access to competent professional interpreters to ensure
understanding and participation for all non-English speaking
persons” facing the court.85 The Atlanta Immigration Court’s casual
approach to in-court interpretation suggests, at best, a cursory
commitment to ensuring immigrants’ due process rights. At worst,
the Atlanta Immigration Court’s documented behavior toward
immigrants reveals contempt toward asylum seekers that is
seemingly unmatched by other immigration courts. The Eleventh
Circuit’s reluctance to overturn, or even challenge, the lower courts’
continued application of social visibility represents a missed
opportunity to remind the Atlanta Immigration Court of its due
process and humanitarian obligations to asylum seekers.
1. The Eleventh Circuit’s Application of Social Visibility to
Claims Based on Gang
Opposition
Beginning with Castillo-Arias, the Eleventh Circuit has used the
social-visibility requirement to justify the lower courts’ growing
distaste for gang-based asylum claims.86 These claims are
particularly vulnerable to the harsh social-visibility requirement
because people persecuted by gangs typically try their best not to be
recognizable as gang targets.87 Central America’s Northern Triangle
(El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) contains some of the most
violent countries in the world.88 Gangs in these countries have
85. Georgia Commission on Interpreters, JUD. COUNCIL GA., http://coi.georgiacourts.gov/
[https://perma.cc/PLW4-VQLE] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
86. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11th Cir. 2006).
87. See U.S. DEP’T STATE, EL SALVADOR 2016 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 13 (updated 2017).
88. Danielle Renwick, Central America’s Violent Northern Triangle, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle
[https://perma.cc/Q75383PK] (last updated Jan. 19, 2016). El Salvador in particular is the “world’s most violent country not at
war.” Id. Of thirty million residents, “nearly 10[%]” of people from countries in the Northern Triangle
have left, “mostly for the United States.” Id.
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assumed significant control; according to the most recent Human
Rights Report for El Salvador:
Each gang had its own controlled territory. Gang members
did not allow persons living in another gang’s controlled
area to enter their territory, even when travelling in public
transportation. Gangs forced persons to present
identification cards (that contain their addresses) to
determine where they lived. If gang members discovered
that a person lived in a rival gang’s territory, that person
might be killed, beaten, or not allowed to enter the territory.
Bus companies paid extortion fees to operate within gang
territories, often paying numerous fees for the different
areas in which they operated. The extortion costs were
passed on to paying customers.89
Because gangs have amassed the power to restrict movement to the
point where people who live in rival gangs’ territories are killed
simply for entering certain areas, gang victims are understandably
reluctant to identify themselves as targets.90 Just as a gay man in
Brazil might do everything in his power to avoid presenting as gay
because he is significantly more likely to be killed for his sexuality in
Brazil than in the United States, people in Central America who
oppose gangs must necessarily avoid making their opinions publicly
known.91 Legal critics argue that the Eleventh Circuit’s continued
application of the social-visibility requirement makes winning
asylum nearly impossible for victims of gang persecution because
people in societies overridden by gangs must hide their opposition to
gangs to survive.92

89. U.S. DEP’T STATE, supra note 87, at 16.
90. Id.
91. Vinicius de Vita, An LGBT Person is Murdered Every 28 Hours in Brazil, HUFFINGTON POST
(July
11,
2016),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/vinacius-de-vita/one-lgbt-killed-every-28_b_10927070.html [https://perma.cc/JH9F-EUZ6].
92. See U.S. DEP’T STATE, supra note 87, at 16.
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2. Applicability to Gender-Based Claims
Just as those who oppose or work against gangs are not typically
“visible” to society at large, minorities who suffer from gender-based
persecution are frequently invisible (or encouraged to remain
invisible) within their societies.93 According to the most recent
Human Rights Report from El Salvador:
NGOs reported that public officials, including police,
engaged in violence and discrimination against sexual
minorities. Persons from the LGBTI community stated that
the agencies in charge of processing identification
documents, the PNC, and the Attorney General’s Office
harassed transgender and gay individuals when they
applied for identification cards or reported cases of
violence against LGBTI persons. The LGBTI community
reported authorities harassed LGBTI persons by conducting
strip searches and questioning their gender in a degrading
manner. The government responded to these abuses
primarily through PDDH reports that publicized specific
cases of violence and discrimination against sexual
minorities.94
Further, “a large portion of the population” in South America
considers domestic violence “socially acceptable”; just as with rape,
domestic violence is not widely reported.95 This instinct to normalize
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The report further details that in 2016:
Laws against domestic violence were not well enforced, and cases were not effectively
prosecuted. The law prohibits mediation in domestic violence disputes. Between
January and July 2016, ISDEMU reported 21 cases of femicide, 458 cases of physical
abuse, 385 cases of sexual violence, and 2,259 cases of psychological abuse. ISDEMU
reported 3,070 cases of domestic violence against women during the same period. In
June ISDEMU issued its 2015 annual report on violence against women and reported
that 230 died due to violence in the first six months of 2015, compared with 294
during the same period in 2014 and 217 in 2013.
Id.
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gender and sexuality-based violence in countries where this violence
is rampant renders its victims invisible.96
Even when an applicant fought publicly against an oppressively
silent society, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the social-visibility
requirement to affirm the lower court’s asylum denial.97 In Fejza v.
U.S. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied
asylum to a woman who, as a fifteen-year-old, was designated for an
arranged marriage with a thirty-year-old man. When she refused to
marry him, her father beat her badly.98 Two years later, she fled to
another village and married her boyfriend, which prompted death
threats from her own family and from her previous fiancé and his
family.99 While she and her husband stood at a bus stop, the
applicant’s former fiancé fired gunshots at her and her husband.100
After receiving continued threats over several years from her former
fiancé and his family, the applicant fled to the United States with her
daughter.101 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the BIA’s decision that
“women in Albania who refuse their families’ arranged marriages”
do not belong to a cognizable Particular Social Group because “the
record did not indicate that the members of this group are a distinct
and recognizable group in Albanian society.”102 However, the
applicant was apparently recognizable enough to her persecutors—
even after disowning her family and fleeing to a different village, two
different families managed to find her and threaten her for years until
she left the country.103 The BIA suggested that her Particular Social
Group failed because it was “not defined by an economic, cultural, or
ethnic grouping . . . or other characteristics that define[d] the group in
other than in an amorphous fashion.”104 Aside from formally creating

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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Fejza v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 489 F. App’x 326, 329–30 (11th Cir. 2012).
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Id. at 329–30.
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a group to demonstrate her opposition to the longstanding cultural
institution of arranged marriage and to patriarchal attitudes in
Albanian society, it is unclear what more the applicant could have
done to become socially visible.105
III. Proposal
In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
possibility of rejecting the social-visibility requirement,
acknowledging an asylum seeker’s argument that social visibility is
“arbitrary, inconsistent, and contrary to the law.”106 Somewhat
reluctantly, the court ultimately decided it was “bound” to apply
social visibility because the requirement had not been struck down by
the Supreme Court or by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals en
banc.107 Here, five years after Castillo-Arias, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals explicitly considered criticism of the socialvisibility requirement and demonstrated a potential willingness to
reconsider the requirement in the future.108 In 2019, the Eleventh
Circuit, which unlike several other circuit courts has not yet
discussed Matter of A-B, has the opportunity to reject lower courts’
overt hostility toward those seeking asylum based on persecution
stemming from gender or gang violence.
The Eleventh Circuit should revisit its position in Pierre v. U.S.
Attorney General in light of the UNHCR’s clarification and criticism
of the BIA’s social-visibility requirement, imposed after

105. See Albania: Forced Marriages of Women, Including Those Who Are Already Married; State
Protection and Resources Provided to Women Who Try to Avoid a Marriage Imposed on Them,
IMMIGR.
&
REFUGEE
BOARD
CAN.
(Aug.
13,
2015),
https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/311896/436061_en.html
[https://perma.cc/7SL6-8ECF].
Nongovernmental organizations report that “forced marriages occur frequently, especially in rural areas
and informal settlements; however, ‘real figures do not exist’ regarding the incidence [sic] forced
marriage . . . .” Id. Although “society in general does not approve [of] forced marriages,” they are a
“well[-]known phenomenon in the country, especially in rural remote areas” where “patriarchal
menalit[ies]” are more prevalent. Id.
106. Pierre v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 432 F. App’x 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2011).
107. Id. at 848.
108. Id.
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misinterpreting UNHCR guidance.109 By rejecting this requirement
and adopting a more nuanced test for Particular Social Groups, the
Eleventh Circuit would encourage immigration courts with wildly
disparate outcomes to again reach decisions consistent with the
international agreements that formed the basis for United States
asylum law and with the original Matter of Acosta line of asylum
decisions.
A. The Eleventh Circuit Should Adopt the UNHCR’s Clarified
Guidance Suggesting Social Visibility as an Alternative Basis for
Forming a Particular Social Group
Although the UNHCR’s guidelines are not binding on United
States asylum law, as previously discussed, the UNHCR is the
“guardian” of the 1951 Convention—the source of United States
asylum law; moreover, the BIA relied on its interpretation of the
UNHCR’s 2002 guidance to impose the social-visibility
requirement.110 The UNHCR called for a reconciliation of the
“immutability” and “social perception approaches” with a single
standard for Particular Social Groups: “persons who share a common
characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are
perceived as a group by society.”111 The BIA then described visibility
109. Brief for Refugees as Amicus Curiae, supra note 64, at 6.
110. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956–57 (B.I.A. 2006); Guidelines on International Protection, supra
note 49, at 1; THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967
PROTOCOL, supra note 28, at 6. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) characterized the UNHCR’s
guidelines as “combin[ing] elements of the Acosta immutable or fundamental characteristic approach, as
well as the Second Circuit’s ‘social perception’ approach.” C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956–57 (B.I.A.
2006). The BIA also interpreted the guidelines to “confirm that ‘visibility’ is an important element in
identifying the existence of a particular social group.” Id. at 960. Those guidelines, “intended to provide
legal interpretative guidance for governments, legal practitioners, decision-makers, and the judiciary,” in
part urged that “particular social group should be read in an evolutionary manner, open to the diverse
and changing nature of groups in various societies and evolving international human rights norms.”
Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 49, at ¶ 3.
111. Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 49, at ¶ 6 (emphasis added). UNHCR added:
This definition includes characteristics which are historical and therefore cannot be
changed, and those which, though it is possible to change them, ought not to be
required to be changed because they are so closely linked to the identity of the person
or are an expression of fundamental human rights. It follows that sex can properly be
within the ambit of the social group category, with women being a clear example of a
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as an “important element in identifying the existence of a particular
social group.”112
Given the UNHCR’s integral role in originating and contributing
to the evolution of United States asylum law, the Eleventh Circuit
should recognize the UNHCR’s caution against the BIA’s
overreliance on social visibility by following the UNHCR’s
Particular Social Group definition: “persons who share a common
characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are
perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be one
which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to
identity, conscience, or the exercise of one’s human rights.”113 The
Eleventh Circuit should correct the BIA’s misinterpretation of the
UNHCR’s “alternate approaches” as “dual requirements” and thus
restore the circuit’s consistency with the Matter of Acosta line of
cases.114 In light of the “overwhelming constitutional concerns”115
associated with returning an asylum seeker to a country that he
believes will torture or kill him, the Eleventh Circuit should retreat
from its current level of deference to the BIA and adopt the
UNHCR’s clarified guidance to standardize lower courts’
inconsistent asylum grant rates and correct for biases against asylum
seekers in immigration courts like Atlanta with outlying denial rates.
This rule adds social visibility as an alternative to Matter of
Acosta’s immutable-characteristic test, helping adjudicators “identify
and discern social groups that exist in a particular society, without
opening up . . . ground” for Particular Social Groups “to become a
‘catch all’ classification” for claims that simply do not merit asylum
social subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics, and who are frequently
treated differently to men.
Id. at ¶ 12.
112. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006).
113. Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 49, at ¶ 11. The UNHCR also notes that “the
Board in Acosta did not require either a ‘social perception’ or ‘social visibility’ test, and [we] would
caution the Board against adopting such a rigid approach which may disregard groups that the
Convention is designed to protect.” Brief for Refugees as Amicus Curiae, supra note 64, at 10.
114. Brief for Refugees as Amicus Curiae, supra note 64, at 5.
115. Matthew F. Soares, Agencies and Aliens: A Modified Approach to Chevron Deference in
Immigration Cases, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 925, 933 (2014).
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relief.116 For example, this test would not allow a proposed group that
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals previously rejected (“attractive
women sexually harassed by government or police officers”)117 to
amount to a cognizable Particular Social Group. Attractiveness is not
a characteristic “so fundamental to individual identity or conscience”
that it can be considered immutable.118 This asylum claim, which was
previously rejected by the Eleventh Circuit, would still fail under the
more reasonable alternatives test. The addition of immutability as an
alternative basis to social visibility for forming a Particular Social
Group will not open the floodgates to undeserving “catch[]all” cases;
instead, it will produce outcomes in the same spirit as Matter of
Acosta and reduce the wide variances in asylum adjudications
between judges.119
1. Effects on Gender-Based Particular Social Groups
Reintroducing immutability as an alternative to social visibility
will lead to fairer outcomes for gender-based Particular Social
Groups. Gender, which is excluded from the primary four bases for
asylum (race, religion, nationality, and political opinion), is a target
for numerous forms of persecution.120 Immigration courts currently
fail to “respond to the urgent needs” of women subjected to
persecution in their countries of origin.121 The primary cause of this
failure is the stringent application of social visibility to claims of
persecution based on gender. Women who oppose female genital
mutilation, women who oppose arranged marriages, and transgender
women, for example, must by necessity remain invisible in
116. Brief for Refugees as Amicus Curiae, supra note 64, at 9–10.
117. Udesh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 518 F. App’x 921, 924 (11th Cir. 2013).
118. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
119. See id.; Brief for Refugees as Amicus Curiae, supra note 64, at 5.
120. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2018). The UNHCR acknowledged that asylum has been approached
through “male experiences,” meaning that “many claims of women and of homosexuals[] have gone
unrecognised [sic].” UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution
Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002).
121. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102 (1980).
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oppressive societies. Returning to women the ability to present an
immutable characteristic as the basis for a Particular Social Group
rather than requiring women to lay bare their vulnerabilities in public
would represent a “logical and disciplined application of the law”
that takes a “middle-ground approach” to recognize gender-based
groups.122 The immutable-characteristic test “acknowledge[es] that
the Particular Social Group category was meant to expand relief”
beyond race, religion, nationality, and political opinion but not to the
point that the test becomes “inconsequential.”123
Under the “alternatives” framework proposed by UNHCR, Fejza v.
U.S. Attorney General would have a more reasonable outcome. No
longer constrained by social visibility, the court would be free to find
that the asylum seeker’s opposition to and defiance of forced
marriage amounted to an immutable characteristic because her
resistance to societal norms is fundamental to her identity,
conscience, and exercise of her human rights.124 Thus, under this
alternative framework, women opposed to forced marriages could
escape their predicaments without having to prove that they were
perceived in society as cultural opposition. By removing the perverse
incentive for vulnerable individuals to project their opposition to
government or cultural forces of persecution to society at large, the

122. Jesse Imbriano, Note, Opening the Floodgates or Filling the Gap?: Perdomo v. Holder Advances
the Ninth Circuit One Step Closer to Recognizing Gender-Based Asylum Claims, 56 VILL. L. REV. 327,
344 (2011).
123. Id. To those who would argue that this treatment of gender-based claims would “open the
floodgates,” Imbriano responds:
Emphasis on the size of the social group is misplaced. Appropriate interpretation of
the refugee definition does not require that a particular social group be a small
category but actually suggests that it is a very large category parallel to race, religion,
and nationality. Additionally, concern for the size of the group ignores the importance
of other requirements for protection under asylum law. Recognition of a gender-based
particular social group does not grant blanket asylum to all women in the cited
country. Female victims of random criminal activity, for example, would not be
eligible for asylum. If an immigration judge finds that a female asylum applicant was
victimized through an individualized attack, unrelated to her identity as a woman, the
judge will not approve her claim for asylum.
Id. at 350–51.
124. Fejza v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 489 F. App’x 326, 329 (11th Cir. 2012); Guidelines on
International Protection, supra note 49, at ¶ 11.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss3/6

28

Heffley: Deference Condoning Apathy: Social Visibility in the Eleventh Cir

2019]

DEFERENCE CONDONING APATHY

805

Eleventh Circuit can help restore reasoned compassion to the asylum
process in the southeastern United States.
2. Effects on Gang-Based Particular Social Groups
Likewise, allowing immutability as an alternative to social
visibility will result in fairer adjudications of gang-based asylum
claims in southeastern immigration courts. People like Heidy, who
expressly oppose gang practices through words or action, would have
the opportunity to prove that their anti-gang positions are
characteristics fundamental to their identity or conscience.125 Under
this framework, the success of Heidy’s claim would not hinge upon
showing that gang members limited their persecution to students like
Heidy and that people like her opposed to the gangs were
“generally . . . recognizable by others in the community.”126 The fact
that gangs target many groups of people should not preclude their
lower profile opposition from winning safety from persecution.
The Eleventh Circuit is hesitant to exercise its discretion favorably
toward gang-based asylum claims. Indeed, these claims are
unpopular—some in the judiciary view being targeted by gangs as a
poor reflection on asylum seekers’ own characters, or at best, a
nonactionable instance of a country “hav[ing] problems effectively
policing certain crimes.”127 This current approach only punishes
those courageous enough to defy the gangs. The Eleventh Circuit
should encourage opposition to gangs among asylum seekers by
applying the UNHCR’s framework and by welcoming “individuals
who have rejected the gangster lifestyle and have been persecuted
and harmed as a result of that rejection.”128
125. Vasquez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 345 F. App’x 441, 445 (11th Cir. 2009); Guidelines on
International Protection, supra note 49, at ¶ 11.
126. Vasquez, 345 F. App’x at 446.
127. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 316 (U.S. Attorney Gen. 2018) (interim decision) , abrogated by
Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018) (appeal filed D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019); see
Cantillo-Charris v. U.S. Attorney. Gen., 382 F. App’x 817, 819–20 (11th Cir. 2010); Navas-Villanueva
v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 338 F. App’x 859, 861 (11th Cir. 2009); Gomez-Benitez v. U.S. Attorney Gen.,
295 F. App’x 324, 326 (11th Cir. 2008).
128. Lorena S. Rivas-Tiemann, Asylum to a Particular Social Group: New Developments and Its
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Adopting immutability as an alternative to social visibility would
realign decisions with Matter of Acosta. For example, former military
members who testified against illegal armed groups in Colombia who
are not sufficiently socially visible because they testified in “private”
criminal proceedings129 would no longer be barred from asylum.
These applicants could again rely upon the immutable fact of their
military service and recorded opposition to gangs when applying for
asylum. By allowing those opposed to gangs to gain asylum through
an immutable characteristic rather than recognition by society (for
example, young men who protested MS-13 but, despite belonging to
a formal group, were not recognized by society as MS-13’s
opposition),130 the Eleventh Circuit would restore consistency to the
Particular Social Group analysis.
CONCLUSION
By continuing to accept lower courts’ strict application of social
visibility as a requirement for cognizable Particular Social Groups,
the Eleventh Circuit excludes meritorious asylum claims and
condones troubling behavior toward asylum seekers. The current
application of the social-visibility requirement punishes vulnerable
groups for hiding their vulnerabilities within hostile societies. To
Future for Gang-Violence Victims, 47 TULSA L. REV. 477, 501 (2011). Rivas-Tiemann recognizes the
value of the immutability test for gender and gang-based particular social groups:
On the other hand, both groups of gender violence and gang violence victims have a
greater opportunity to pass the Acosta test. The characteristics of having intact
genitalia, being involved with a male companion who practiced male domination
through violence, and refusing to join a gang are all common characteristics that
cannot be changed or should not be made to change. Additionally, the youth
characteristic that many gang violence victims use also meets the Acosta test because a
person cannot change their age. Therefore, the particular social groups consisting of
gang violence victims would meet the Acosta test and be able to proceed to the rest of
the asylum analysis. Since the social visibility test has not been used for victims of
FGM and domestic violence, it should similarly be rejected and not used for victims of
gang violence.
Id. at 499.
129. Granados v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 578 F. App’x 866, 871–72 (11th Cir. 2014).
130. Navas-Villanueva, 338 F. App’x at 861.
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reach decisions consistent with the United States’s original asylum
law, the Eleventh Circuit should adopt the immutability-and-socialvisibility-alternatives test proposed by the UNHCR. This adoption
would correct the lower courts’ misapplication of UNHCR guidance
and provide fairer remedies for vulnerable but less visible groups
seeking refuge from persecution. Even more critically, adopting the
UNHCR’s test would send an important message to immigration
courts like Atlanta’s with outlying denial rates: the social-visibility
requirement will no longer shield apathy and inconsistency.
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